Iraq
The fight for Mosul: An assessment of ISIS tactics, key vulnerabilities

The fight for Mosul: An assessment of ISIS tactics, key vulnerabilities


In the initial phase of combat to reclaim Mosul, (October 17th through mid-December 2016), the occupying ISIS’ radical Islamic terrorists inflicted heavy casualties (the UN previously estimated approximately 2000 IMC troops killed). Iraqi Military Coalition (IMC) forces cleared only several outlying villages and penetrated just a few blocks inside of eastern Mosul during this period.

This “slow and bloody slog” prompted Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi to order his IMC generals to temporarily pause combat operations. PM Abadi immediately traveled to the front lines (10 miles south of Mosul) to meet with his generals and assess the IMC operations.

IMC forces were, among other things, confronting ISIS’ use of the following asymmetric tactics to neutralize IMC forces’ superior advantage in firepower:

According to Stephen Kalin of Reuters on January 19, 2017, “The coalition insists that on the battlefield the Iraqis ‘own the plan.’ But Iraqi commanders say the Americans’ advice, like their firepower, has become indispensable.”

After 16 days of intense preparations, IMC forces restarted their new “Phase 2” assault on eastern Mosul on December 29, 2016. By January 19, 2017, IMC forces made quick and successful progress in recapturing most of eastern Mosul. This included controlling the approaches to all five US-bombed (and impassable) bridges over the Tigris River that connect western and eastern Mosul.

The latest update (as of January 22, 2017) on the tactical situation in eastern Mosul, according to Joel Wing of “Iraq Musings” (an eight-year-old blogspot covering Iraqi politics, economics, and national security) and the “Falcon Group,” a highly reliable commercial intelligence organization: “The group [ISIS] is facing food shortages in west Mosul, and hunting down deserters, confiscating their property and burning their homes in west Mosul. The group’s defenses collapsed in east Mosul.”

So, let us assess ISIS’ current tactics and operational circumstances. This will enable the IMC to analyze its potential tactical options for the final attack on the ISIS stronghold in western Mosul.

After studying the operational factors above, I believe that ISIS in western Mosul has several exploitable weaknesses for IMC to consider in its upcoming final attack plans for western Mosul:

  1. ISIS is surrounded by the IMC and cut off from its supply lines. Time is not on ISIS’ side. IMC forces can, therefore, pick when and where to attack ISIS in western Mosul. The IMC can use some time to make sure they are planning every detail and rehearsing before the attack.
  2. ISIS’ supreme headquarters in Raqqa has its own survival problems; therefore, ISIS Mosul fighters are not likely to be reinforced or resupplied. Every day makes them weaker.
  3. The remaining 5000 (+/-) ISIS fighters in western Mosul are too small to react to multiple IMC attacks simultaneously. This weakness could be intensified by IMC feints, ruses, and deception activities. Five thousand ISIS fighters can’t control over 500,000 Mosul civilians who will flee their entrapment. Fleeing civilians can provide actionable intelligence for the IMC.
  4. ISIS’ cell phone communications can be jammed by the IMC at a time and place of the IMC’s choosing. This can severely degrade ISIS’ command and control.
  5. ISIS is vulnerable to night attacks now that IMC SOF has become more proficient at night attacks in eastern Mosul. This advantage will enable IMC forces to reduce both military and civilian casualties.